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Economic sanctions are court-imposed obligations requiring of-
fenders to pay money. Although until recently there have been
few analyses of economic sanctions,' they are often part of crimi-
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1. See R. Barry Ruback & Mark H. Bergstrom, Economic Sanctions in Criminal Jus-
tice: Purposes, Effects, and Implications, 33 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 242 (2006).
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nal sentences.2 Indeed, in the past two decades, economic sanc-
tions have become increasingly more common, being imposed on
sixty-six percent of prisoners in 2004, up from twenty-five percent
in 1991.' Moreover, for three reasons these sanctions are likely to
be used more frequently in the future.4 First, the costs of the
criminal justice system have risen substantially; one dollar of eve-
ry fifteen dollars in state general funds is spent on corrections5
and courts have cut staff and shortened hours.6  Offenders are
now expected to pay at least part of the costs of criminal justice
operations, including the cost of incarceration.7 Second, there are
increasing pressures for intermediate sanctions that are more se-
vere than mere probation, but less severe, less expensive, and
more effective than imprisonment.8 To a great extent, this need
for intermediate sanctions is driven by the fact that the number of
incarcerated individuals is high, more than 1.6 million at year-end
2009.' Despite this high number, imprisonment is now less likely
than it used to be because of overcrowded conditions 9 and more
individuals, more than 4.2 million,1 are now on probation. Third,
concern for victims has increased the likelihood that restitution
will be awarded.1 2 Pennsylvania, for example, in 1995 eliminated
2. See Sally T. Hillsman, Fines and Day Fines, 12 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 49, 51 (1990). Typically, economic sanctions in the United States are additional
penalties, rather than sole sanctions. Id. at 49.
3. Alexes Harris, Heather Evans, & Katherine Beckett, Drawing Blood from Stones:
Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. OF SOC.
1753, 1769 (2010).
4. Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 1, at 243.
5. Christine S. Scott-Hayward, The Fiscal Crisis in Corrections: Rethinking Policies
and Practices, N.Y.: VERA INSTIT. OF JUST. 1, 3 (2009).
6. Editorial, State Courts at the Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2009, at A30.
7. Fox Butterfield, F., Many Local Officials Now Make Inmates Pay Their Own Way,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at Al, A17. See also David E. Olson & Gerard F. Ramker, Crime
Does Not Pay, But Criminals May: Factors Influencing the Imposition and Collection of
Probation Fees, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 29, 30 (2001).
8. Michael Tonry, M., & Mary Lynch, Intermediate Sanctions, 20 CRIME AND JUSTICE:
A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99 (1996).
9. Heather C. West, William J. Sabol, W. J, & Sarah J. Greenman, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, Bulletin: Prisoners in 2009, NCJ 231675 (2010).
10. David J. Levin, Patrick A. Langan & Jodi M. Brown, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, Bulletin: State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons in 1996, NCJ 175708
(2000).
11. Lauren E. Glaze, Thomas P. Bonczar & Fan Zhang, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, Bulletin: Probation and Parole in the United States, NCJ 231674 1, 2 (2009).
12. See New Directions from the Field: Victims' Rights and Services for the 21' Century,
OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME (1998). See also R. Barry Ruback, Gretchen R. Ruth & Jen-
nifer N. Shaffer, Assessing the Impact of Statutory Change: A Statewide Multilevel Analysis
of Restitution Orders in Pennsylvania, 51 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 318 (2005); R. Barry
Ruback & Jennifer N. Shaffer, The Role of Victim-Related Factors in Victim Restitution: A
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judicial discretion in decisions about whether to order restitution
by making restitution mandatory.'
3
In this article we examine the current use of economic sanctions
in Pennsylvania, and report comparisons by county, by current
offense, and by the offender's prior record. Our analyses suggest
that the fairness of economic sanctions in Pennsylvania is under-
mined by their complexity and by the inconsistency of their appli-
cation. Our article consists of four parts. First, we describe the
three primary types of economic sanctions. Second, we describe
our method for analyzing the imposition of economic sanctions in
Pennsylvania. Third, we present results from our analyses. Fi-
nally, we suggest that the complexity and inconsistency of applica-
tion undermines the fairness of economic sanctions in Pennsyl-
vania.
I. TYPES OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Economic sanctions 4 can be of three types:"5 fines, costs and
fees, and restitution. These three types of sanctions can be used
to serve one or more purposes of sentencing, including punish-
ment, deterrence, rehabilitation, and restoration of justice.
A. Fines
Fines are monetary penalties for crime. Nationally, they are
imposed on thirty-three percent of convicted felons.'6 Not only do
fines punish offenders, but also they can provide funds to support
criminal justice operations, either in general or for some targeted
purpose, such as a Crime Victim Compensation Fund.' Moreover,
fines can be flexible, in that they can be tailored to the specific
criminal's prior record and economic resources. Fines can be used
as sole sanctions or in combination with other sanctions, from
Multi-Method Analysis of Restitution in Pennsylvania, 29 LAw & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 657
(2005).
13. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1106 (West 2005).
14. These sanctions are sometimes referred to as monetary sanctions, financial obliga-
tions, and legal financial obligations. See Robert W. Tobin, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, Funding the State Courts: Issues and Approaches (1996); AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, In For a Penny: The rise of America's New Debtors' Prisons, (2010); Alicia
Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha, & Rebekah Diller, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, Criminal
Justice Debt: A Barrier to Re-entry (2010).
15. In this discussion, we exclude civil and criminal forfeiture of property.
16. Matthew R. Durose, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, State Court Sentencing of
Convicted Felons in 2004, NCJ 217995, tbl. 1.9 (2007).
17. 18 Pa. C. S. §11.1101(b)(1).
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treatment to incarceration. Fines can also be targeted to support
specific purposes. For example, most fines in the federal system
are deposited in the Crime Victims Fund, ninety-percent of which
is sent to the states for victim compensation and assistance.
' 8
In the United States, there is some resistance to fines because
they cannot be enforced against the poor19 and have little impact
on the wealthy." Fines with absolute maximums can become in-
effective if legislatures do not regularly update them to adjust for
inflation.21 Fines that have a statutorily defined and predeter-
mined amount are regressive and do not meet the goals of indi-
vidualized justice. Thus, fines in the United States tend to be
used primarily in courts of limited jurisdiction, particularly traffic
courts.22 Fines are also used in lower courts for minor offenses,
such as shoplifting, especially for first-time offenders who have
enough money to pay the fine.22 In the United States, fines are
used in forty-two percent of courts of general jurisdiction and
eighty-six percent of cases in courts of limited jurisdiction.24
18. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-99-70, FEDERAL COURTS: DIFFERENCES
EXIST IN ORDERING FINES AND RESTITUTION 1, 1 (1999).
19. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (held that judges cannot impose incar-
ceration as a penalty for nonpayment unless there is a hearing that determines that the
defendant has the ability to pay, but willfully refuses to do so).
20. Hillsman, supra note 2, at 53-54. In contrast, in Europe, fines are the legally pre-
sumptive penalty, constituting, for example, eighty .to ninety percent of all sentences in the
Netherlands and Sweden. Tonry & Lynch, 1996. In Germany, eighty percent of convicted
offenders are ordered to pay a fine. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INTERIOR & FEDERAL MINISTRY
OF JUSTICE, First Periodical Report on Crime and Crime Control in Germany 1, 33 (2001).
Criminal fines are imposed in seventy-seven percent of cases in England and Wales. D.
Moxon, M. Sutton, & C. Hedderman, Unit Fines: Experiments in Four Courts (1990).
One type of fines commonly used in Europe is the day fine, which is based on the severity of
the crime and the offender's ability to pay (typically, the offender's daily income). A second
type of fine common in Europe is a method to divert the offender from criminal justice
processing. If the defendant agrees to pay the fine (typically the amount that would have
been imposed had the defendant been convicted), charges are conditionally dismissed.
Hillsman, supra note 2, at 76.
21. See Robert W. Gillespie, Criminal fines: Do they pay?, 13 JUST. SYS. J. 365 (1988-
89).
22. Sally T. Hillsman, Joyce L. Sichel & Barry Mahoney, Fines in Sentencing: A Study
of the Use of the Fine as a Criminal Sanction, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE NCJ 096334
(1984).
23. Sally T. Hillsman, Barry Mahoney, George Cole, & Bernard Auchter, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, Fines as Criminal Sanctions, NCJ 107773 (1987).
24. David Weisburd, Tomer Einat, & Matt Kowalski, The Miracle of the Cells: An Ex-
perimental Study of Interventions to Increase Payment of Court-Ordered Financial Obliga-
tions, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POLY 9, 12 (2008).
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Within a jurisdiction, judges usually apply the "going rate" for
fines.25 Thus, all violators of a particular offense are obligated to
pay the same or similar amounts. Because judges tend to use this
going rate for fines, however, they neglect to adjust the serious-
ness of the penalty to the particular defendant. Furthermore, be-
cause this going rate is usually low (in order to accommodate the
poorest offenders), fines often have little penalty value for wealthy
offenders. Rather than make adjustments at initial sentencing,
judges tend to make adjustments to fines at the back end, when
they often excuse the remaining unpaid portion or simply let the
probation period expire without enforcing the fine.
B. Costs and Fees
Costs and fees refer to court-imposed orders to reimburse the
jurisdiction (local, county, state) for the administrative cost of op-
erating the criminal justice system. Although the terms costs and
fees are often used interchangeably, one way that the two have
been differentiated is that costs describe blanket charges for pro-
gram admission or participation, whereas a fee refers to a specific,
individual charge for a service.26 Thus, in Pennsylvania the cost
for ARD/Fast Track covers the court-processing expenses associ-
ated with a court diversion program.27 An example of a fee is a
$250 charge to pay for DNA analysis.28
Supervision fees, which are the most common type of special
condition of probation,29 help defray the costs of preparing presen-
tence reports and supervising probationers. In some states, pro-
bation departments are self-supported by these supervision fees."
Such fees are also a necessity in jurisdictions where correctional
budgets do not cover the costs of supervision.3 Special services,
such as electronic monitoring, require additional fees.
25. Sally T. Hillsman & Judith A. Greene, The Use of Fines an Intermediate Sanction,
in SMART SENTENCING: THE EMERGENCE OF INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS 123, 127 (James M.
Byrne, Arthur J. Lurigio, & Joan Petersilia eds., 1992).
26. Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 1, at 253.
27. Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 1, at 253-54.
28. Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 1, at 253-54.
29. Bonczar, T. P., Characteristics of Adults on Probation, 1995, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS: SPECIAL REPORT 1, 6 (1997).
30. Olson & Ramker, supra note 7, at 30.
31. Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW




Restitution refers to a payment by the offender to the victim for
financial losses. All states have statutory restitution provisions,32
and some states, like Pennsylvania, have made it a mandatory
condition." In some states, restitution is justified by its rehabili-
tative effects on offenders, whereas in other states it is justified by
its restorative effects on victims. 3 4 Restitution is aimed at doing
justice by having the offender compensate a victim for damages
caused by the crime.
Nationally, it is imposed on eighteen percent of convicted fel-
ons.35 In general, it is handled either through Victim/Witness As-
sistance Programs and Victim-Offender Reconciliation Programs,
which are victim-focused agencies, or through probation/parole
supervision and court-based employment programs, which are of-
fender-focused agencies. Restitution programs have generally
been seen as unsuccessful for three reasons: (a) judges are reluc-
tant to impose restitution on offenders who are assumed to be un-
able to pay it; (b) payment on restitution orders typically follows
other financial obligations (e.g., costs and fines); and (c) there is
often ambiguity about who is responsible for monitoring, collect-
ing, disbursing, and enforcing restitution payments. 36 Moreover,
there are differences among states in terms of whether indirect
victims (e.g., insurance companies) and local governments are en-
titled to restitution.37
A study of felony probation in thirty-two counties found that
restitution to the victim was ordered in 29% of the cases and that
the average restitution order imposed per probationer was
$3,369.38 Research suggests that the collection rates of restitution
32. Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Mario T. Gaboury, Arrick L. Jackson, & Ashley G. Black-
burn, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (2nd ed. 2010) at 157.
33. 18 Pa. C.S. §1106.
34. Andrew W. Klein, ALTERNATiVE SENTENCING: INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS AND
PROBATION 156 (2nd ed. 1997)., at 156-7.
35. Durose, supra note 16, at tbl. 1.9.
36. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 12.
37. Klein, supra note 34, at 170.
38. Mark A. Cunniff & Mary K Shilton, Variations on Felony Probation Persons Under
Supervision in 32 Urban and Suburban Counties (Mar. 1991) at 34, 36 available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/Digitization/13158ONCJRS.pdf
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are low: forty-five percent in one national study,39 and thirty-four
percent in Cook County (Chicago). 0
D. The Problem of Setting the Amount of Sanctions
Because judges lack complete information about offenders' eco-
nomic circumstances, including employment income (net of taxes),
other sources of income (e.g., welfare, unemployment), residence
expenses, and number of dependents,4 they often feel uncomfort-
able setting economic sanction amounts, especially when imposing
multiple economic sanctions. Consistent with the idea that judges
believe there is a total amount of economic sanctions that is fair,
an increase in one type of economic sanction seems to lower the
amounts of other types of economic sanctions. For example, in
their analysis of probation fees in Illinois, Olson and Ramker
found that probationers ordered to pay both fines and probation
fees had lower average monthly fees than probationers ordered to
pay only fees. 42 Similarly, studies in Pennsylvania, using both
state-level data 3 and county-level data44 suggest that the imposi-
tion of restitution is negatively related to the imposition of fines.
A further problem in the setting of economic sanctions is whether
they are imposed consistently and fairly. Some research indicates
that they are imposed differently with respect to location (rural
versus urban areas),45 type of crime,46 and offender characteris-
tics.47 These studies, however, were conducted using relatively
small sample sizes, only a few counties, or only one type of eco-
nomic sanction. Because of these weaknesses, we conducted a
more complete analysis of all economic sanctions in Pennsylvania.
39. Barbara E. Smith, Robert C. Davis, & Susan W. Hillenbrand, Improving Enforce-
ment of Court-Ordered Restitution, A.B.A.1, 4 (1989).
40. Arthur Lurigio, COOK COUNTY ADULT PROBATION DEPARTMENT, The Relationship
Between Offender Characteristics and Fulfillment of Financial Restitution (1984).
41. Hillsman & Greene, supra note 25.
42. Olson & Ramker, supra note 7.
43. Ruback, Ruth, & Shaffer, supra note 12.
44. See R. Barry Ruback, The Imposition of Economic Sanctions in Philadelphia, FED.
PROBATION 21 (2004); R. Barry Ruback, Jennifer N. Shaffer, & Melissa A. Logue, The Im-
position and Effects of Restitution in Four Pennsylvania Counties: Effects of Size of County
and Specialized Collections Units, 50 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 168 (2004).
45. Olson & Ramker, supra note 7, at 31; Ruback, Ruth, & Shaffer, supra note 12, at
323.
46. Margaret A. Gordon & Daniel Glaser, The Use and Effects of Financial Penalties in
Municipal Courts, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 651, 652-53 (1991).
47. Ruback & Shaffer, supra note 12, at 322.
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II. METHOD FOR ANALYZING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN
PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania has one of the most complete data collection sys-
tems in the country, including a record of virtually all economic
sanctions imposed in criminal courts of general jurisdiction. We
used three sets of data to characterize the current use of economic
sanctions in Pennsylvania: (a) data from the Pennsylvania Com-
mission on Sentencing (PCS) on cases sentenced in the years 2006
and 2007; (b) data from the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania
Courts (AOPC) on cases adjudicated in the years 2006 and 2007;
and (c) contextual information at the county level derived primar-
ily from the U.S. Bureau of the Census.48 For individual sen-
tences, we combined the case information from the PCS data with
the detailed information on economic sanctions from the AOPC
data.
A. PCS Data
Under Pennsylvania law, judges are required to submit a com-
puterized Guideline Sentencing Form for most felony and misde-
meanor convictions in the state. 9 This form contains information
about the offender (race, gender, age), the offender's prior convic-
tions, the conviction offenses (offense type, offense severity as
measured by the Offense Gravity Scale of the Guidelines), the
mode of disposition (guilty plea or trial), and the sentence imposed
(incarceration in jail or in prison or not incarcerated, length of
sentence). The PCS data for 2006 contained 134,119 sentences °
48. U.S. Census Bureau, United States Census 2000 available at
http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen 2 0 0 0 .html
49. The Commission's enabling legislation authorizes the Commission to promulgate
forms to document the applications of the sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentencing
laws and to require the timely completion and electronic submission of such forms to the
Commission, 42 Pa. C.S. §2153 (a) (14). Based on this authority, the sentencing guidelines
include provisions that require completion and submission of the guideline form via Sen-
tencing Guidelines Software Web application (204 Pa. Code §303.1(d), (e). Additionally, 42
Pa. C. S. §9721(b), which relates to general standards, contains language requiring courts
to consider the sentencing guidelines, to make part of the record and disclose in open court
at the time of sentencing a statement of the reasons for the sentence imposed, and to report
to the Commission the reasons for any deviation from the guidelines. For information
about the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing generally, see the Commission website
at httpJ/pcs.la.psu.edu/
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and the data for 2007 contained 141,139 sentences," for a total of
275,258 sentences. Most of the information we used in our multi-
variate analyses cam from the PCS data set. The important in-
formation is shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Variables from PCS Data Files used in the Statistical
Analyses
Variable Description Coding Mean
(Std Dev)
Type of Offense Type of offense committed
by offender, dummy coded
by person, property, drug,
traffic, and public order












Offense Severity Measured by the offense
gravity score, ranging from
0 to 14
Prior Record The offender's prior record
score, dummy coded by low
(1 to 3) and high (4 to 5)
scores (no prior record
omitted)
Trial Type of trial for the case,
dummy coded by bench trial
and jury trial, (no trial,
guilty pleas omitted)
Disposition Type of incarceration of-
fender was sentenced to,
dummy coded by county jail
and state prison (no incar-
ceration omitted)
1 = Low Prior Record 29%
1 = High Prior Record 19%
1 = Bench Trial 1%
1 - Jury Trial 2%
1 = County Jail 29%
1 = State Prison 15%
Continuous 3.4 (2.38)












imposed for this offense (no
restitution omitted)
Whether offender is male or
female, dummy coded (fe-
males omitted)
The race/ethnicity of the
offender,
dummy coded by Black and
Hispanic (whites omitted)
The age of the offender,
dummy coded by ages 18
and younger and 10 year
increments
B. AOPC Data
The AOPC data provide detailed information on economic sanc-
tions. The AOPC data for the combined years of 2006 and 2007
totaled 1,584,264 offenses, of which there were 517,160 guilty
52
pleas or guilty verdicts. There were a total of 677,453 sentences
and 5,607,263 economic sanctions imposed. Of these 5.6 million
economic sanctions, fifteen categories accounted for fifty-five per-
cent of the total, as shown in Table 2.
760
1 = Ages 18 & Younger
1 = Ages 18 to 25
1 = Ages 26 to 35




52. The greater number of sentences than convictions is most likely due to the fact that
it is possible to get multiple sentences for the same offense (e.g., probation and incarcera-
tion).
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Table 2. Frequency and Dollar Amount of the 15 Most
Common Economic Sanctions in Pennsylvania. Data
from the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania's Courts,
2006-2007.
Type of Assessment Frequency Amount
Commonwealth Cost - HB627 (Act 167 of
1992)
State Court Cost (Act 204 of 1976)
County Court Costs (Act 204 of 1976)
Crime Victims Compensation (Act 96 of
1984)
Firearm Education and Training Fund (158
of 1994)
Victim Witness Services (Act 111 of 1998)
JCP
ATJ
Domestic Violence Compensation (Act 44 of
1988)
CAT/MCARE (Act 13 of 2002)
Emergency Medical Services (Act 45 of
1985)



































These 5.6 million economic sanctions were imposed from 2,629
different types of sanctions as coded by the AOPC. These included
automation fees, commonwealth costs, and state fines, among
many others. We reviewed the 2,629 different types of sanctions
and recoded them into one of three categories: costs/fees, fines,
and restitution. We further divided costs/fees and fines by wheth-
er they were assessed by the state or county. Of the 2,629 differ-
ent sanctions, eighty-two were state costs/fees, fifty-eight were
state fines, 2,371 were county costs/fees, seventy-nine were county
fines, and thirty-five were restitution.
Condensing the sanctions into a small number of categories was
a difficult process because the distinction between the different
Fall 2011
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types of economic sanctions can sometimes be ambiguous. We
used the label "costs/fees" for economic sanctions that are used to
reimburse the county or state for costs associated with judicialprocedigs ad • 53
proceedings and corrections, including fees for diversion pro-
grams, costs associated with parole and probation (e.g., supervi-
sion, electronic monitoring, drug tests), and law enforcement fees,
and charges for judicial proceedings and diversionary programs
(e.g., bench warrants, fingerprint cards). The 5.6 million economic
sanctions were recoded into six categories, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Mean and Median Amounts of Economic Sanc-
tions by State and County
Type (Number of Sanc- Mean Median Std. Dev
tions)
Costs/Fees Assessed $575.86 $300.00 $1,139.08
(3,187,202)
Fines Assessed $243.62 $109.34 $1,109.46
(2,328,896)
County Costs/Fees $333.08 $193.30 $947.43
(745,908)
County Fines (367,058) $17.58 $22.63 $84.94
State Costs/Fees $242.77 $10.00 $485.56
(2,441,294) .
State Fines (1,961,838) $226.03 $84.70 $1,102.05
Total Assessments $819.47 $485.50 $1,635.07
(Costs/Fees + Fines)
In the table, we present the average amounts of economic sanc-
tions imposed by the type of economic sanction. In this table both
the mean and median amounts imposed are listed, as well as the
standard deviation (an indicator of the variation around the
mean). In general, the mean amounts of economic sanctions im-
posed are higher than the median amounts imposed because, in a
few outlying cases, very high amounts were imposed.
53. Ruback & Bergstrom, supra note 1, at 253.
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C. Merging the AOPC and PCS Data
Combining the AOPC and PCS data sets was difficult for two
reasons. First, the AOPC data included over 1.5 million offenses,
whereas the PCS data included only 275,258 offenses. The AOPC
data was collected when the charges were initially filed, whereas
the PCS data was collected after the offenses had been adjudi-
cated. As a result of charge reductions, adjustments, and case dis-
missals, there were many more offenses included in the AOPC
data than in the PCS data, even after limiting the AOPC data to
guilty pleas and guilty verdicts (i.e., excluding Accelerated Reha-
bilitative Disposition cases, which are a pretrial diversion pro-
gram for first-time nonviolent offenders, dismissed cases, and oth-
er cases for which there was no guilty verdict).
The only identifier shared by both the AOPC and PCS data sets
is the Offense Tracking Number (OTN), which is generated by the
AOPC. The OTN uniquely identifies a set of offenses that took
place within a transaction; therefore, several unique offenses may
be grouped within a single OTN. We found that the best way to
combine the two sets of data was to match them on the OTN, the
title of the offense, and the section, although this method is still
imperfect. Of the 275,258 offenses in the PCS data set, we were
able to match 252,112 offenses (ninety two percent). Of the
265,048 unmatched cases from the AOPC data (517,160 minus
252,112), a little over 80,000 cases were summary offenses, which
are not included in the PCS data set. Of the remaining offenses,
seven counties accounted for seventy three and one-half percent,
suggesting that these counties did not completely report data to
the Sentencing Commission.
D. Census Data
For our contextual analysis, we collected several basic county-
level characteristics and economic indicators, which came primar-
ily from the 2000 United States Census." We included the popu-
lation of the county, the percentage of urban population within
each county, the percentage of the population living below the
poverty level, and the percentage of males fifteen to twenty four
years of age within each county. These variables were included in
order to test whether the size of the county, the degree of urbani-




zation in a county, the economic climate of the county, and the
number of individuals most prone to engaging in crime were re-
lated to how economic sanctions are imposed. As a measure of
political conservatism, we included the percentage of county voters
who voted for the Republican candidate in the 2002 gubernatorial
election. Political conservatism turned out not to be a significant
predictor, therefore, it is not discussed further.
In sum, offenses from the AOPC were merged with offenses
from the PCS using Offense Tracking Number, Title of Offense,
and Offense Section to match cases from the two datasets. A total
of 252,112 cases were matched. Across all cases, the average
amount of economic sanctions imposed was $819, of which $575
was for costs/fees and $243 was for fines.
III. RESULTS OF ANALYSES
The results are presented in two parts. First, we present infor-
mation about economic sanctions at the county level. These re-
sults suggest that there is variability between counties in the im-
position of economic sanctions. Second, we present information
about economic sanctions at the individual level. This section in-
cludes both descriptive information and inferential analyses and
suggests there is variability between individuals.
A. County-Level Analyses
Our first goal was to understand the imposition of economic
sanctions at the county level and whether the imposition of eco-
nomic sanctions varied significantly between counties. These
analyses focused on whether there was variation between counties
in the number of economic sanctions imposed.
Table 4 presents the number of unique economic sanctions im-
posed by each county for the years 2006-2007. Also presented is
the maximum number of sanctions imposed for each case. Thus,
for example, across all of the cases in the sample, Adams County
imposed ninety-nine different types of economic sanctions during
the study period, and the largest number of economic sanctions
that were imposed in Adams County for any one case was thirty-
seven.
764 Vol. 49
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Table 4. Number of Economic Sanctions Imposed by County
County Total Number of Total Number of
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Wyoming 62 21
York 98 116
Across the sixty-seven counties in Pennsylvania, the number of
different economic sanctions imposed varied from forty to one
hundred forty-seven (Mean = 81; Median = 75). Using various
county characteristics that we obtained from the census (e.g., ur-
ban/rural differences, federal expenditures per capita, crime rate),
we conducted several county-level analyses to try to explain the
variation in the number of different types of economic sanctions
that counties impose. Increased average annual wages, more His-
panic residents, more total residents, and more urban residents in
a county were associated with more types of economic sanctions,
whereas more African American residents were associated with
fewer types of economic sanctions. The size of the population and
the average annual wage had a very small positive relationship
with the number of different types of economic sanctions used.
Most of the variation between counties in the number of differ-
ent economic sanctions imposed came from sanctions unique to
each county. For example, one county has a "Cost in Lieu of
Community Service" penalty, and another county has its own
"Drug Investigation" fee. Of the 2,629 different economic sanc-
tions used in the state, 2,371 are county costs/fees and 79 are
county fines. About forty-four percent of all economic sanctions
imposed were county costs/fees and nearly seven percent were
county fines. Across the sixty-seven counties in Pennsylvania, the
percent of sanctions imposed that were county sanctions ranged
from ten percent to seventy percent (Mean = 48%, Mode = 41%).
B. Individual-Level Analyses
In addition to understanding how the imposition of economic
sanctions varied across counties, we were also interested in how
the imposition of economic sanctions varied across individuals.
Particularly, we were intrigued regarding two legally relevant var-
iables, the type of offense the offender was convicted of and the
offender's prior record. There were significant differences among
offense types in the amount of economic sanctions imposed. Traf-
fic offenses (mostly DUIs) received the highest average economic
sanctions ($1,349) and public order offenses receiving the lowest
($624). In between were drug offenses ($881), person offenses
($701), property offenses ($669), and other types of offenses ($630).
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We then computed the mean amount of economic sanctions by
the Prior Record Score used by the Pennsylvania Commission on
Sentencing. No prior record (coded as 0) means, for the most part,
no prior felony convictions. Low prior record means a score of 1, 2,
or 3 on the scale of the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.
High prior record indicates a score of 4 or 5. Those with no prior
record had the highest average total economic sanctions ($862),
those with low prior records had the next highest ($825), and
those with the highest prior records had the lowest total economic
sanctions ($691).5 These differences still appeared even after con-
trolling for other individual-level factors, including whether or not
the offender received a sentence involving incarceration.
C. Multivariate Analyses
Using offense, case, and offender characteristics to predict the
imposition of the total amount of economic sanctions for a given
offense, we found that the type of offense, the offense gravity
score, prior record, and age were the strongest predictors. Higher
economic sanctions were imposed for traffic offenses and more se-
vere offenses. In terms of individual characteristics, lower eco-
nomic sanctions were imposed for individuals with longer records
and younger offenders.
We used interval regression to predict (a) the probability that
an economic sanction was imposed and (b) how far above zero the
sanction was for the six categories mentioned above (the analyses
allowed for robust standard errors to take into account groupings
by county). The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5.
Type of offense (e.g., traffic, drug, person and property offenses)
had the largest and most consistent effect on almost all of the out-
comes. Traffic and drug cases increased the amount of sanctions,
while property and person offenses had a negative influence on
the dollar amount of the sanction. Being sentenced to county jail
or state prison had a positive significant effect on economic sanc-
tions, with prison sentences having a larger effect than county jail,
net of all other factors. Also notable, having a high prior record
score (4-5) had a negative influence on the dollar amount of eco-
nomic sanctions, compared to offenders with a low prior record (1-
3) score and no prior record score. Controlling for type of offense,
the seriousness of the offense (OGS) had a positive influence on
55. For similar findings, see Cunniff & Shilton, supra note 38 at 39.
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the dollar amount of all of the economic sanctions. Finally, age
had a relatively strong negative influence on economic sanctions,
with younger offenders receiving smaller sanctions.
Table 5. Interval Regression Predicting Total Amount of Eco-
nomic Sanctions




Person -84.23 100.94 -390.05* 71.16 -430.26* 72.26
Property -105.10 59.66 -231.94* 48.94 -411.50* 59.49
Drug 106.98 92.38 13.12 81.92 -10.51 82.06
Traffic 921.00* 96.11 694.90* 98.92 657.67* 96.02




Offense Severity 141.83* 21.42 138.30* 19.98
Low Prior Record -26.44 25.73 -21.06 23.63
High Prior Record -205.03* 79.03 -192.85* 72.84
County Jail 427.43* 151.28 397.59* 144.11
State Prison -238.58 191.65 -274.41 177.36
Bench Trial -416.87* 163.83 -398.39* 154.37
Jury Trial -110.98 206.36 -86.30 202.99
Restitution Imposed 620.18* 109.92
Offender
Characteristics
Male -30.39 21.32 -22.45 20.29
Black -131.10 98.85 -101.81 93.41
Hispanic 70.23 131.03 88.71 126.51
Under Age 18 -765.48* 141.05 -764.31* 135.67
Ages 18 to 25 -193.70* 32.12 -205.48* 32.27
Ages 26 to 35 -92.77* 26.03 -101.26* 26.38
Ages 36 to 45 -43.82 24.63 -45.23 24.16
Constant 328.24* 90.83 137.16 102.71 126.6 101.14
Wald 163.21* 719.22* 789.81*
n = 252,112
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We also conducted multilevel analyses using the same measures
with county characteristics (e.g., percentage urban, percentage
black, percentage Hispanic, percentage male between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-five, percentage in poverty, and the crime
rate). The multilevel coefficients were similar to the interval re-
gression coefficients, while the county level effects were negligible
and did not have an impact on the other coefficients. That is,
county characteristics are not significant predictors of the amount
of economic sanctions imposed, once the characteristics of the case
and the offender are taken into account.56
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS
These results indicate that there are a large number of economic
sanctions imposed in Pennsylvania (about 2.8 million per year)
and that these sanctions are from more than 2,600 different cate-
gories. There is significant variation between counties both in the
number of different types of economic sanctions imposed (and the
resulting complexity of the system of economic sanctions) and in
the average and median amounts of economic sanctions imposed
per case. These differences between counties are due primarily to
the population differences between counties and in the percentage
of the population that lives in urban areas. In general, counties
with larger populations and higher percentages of citizens in ur-
ban areas impose more economic sanctions and more different
types of economic sanctions.
There are also significant differences between individuals based
on prior criminal record, although the difference is not in the ex-
pected direction. That is, those who have the most serious crimi-
nal records are likely to have lower economic sanctions imposed.
With regard to type of crime, DUI offenders have much higher
economic sanctions imposed than drug, person, and property of-
fenders.
A. Reduced Number of Economic Sanctions
The fact that there are more than 2,600 different economic sanc-
tions in Pennsylvania is confusing not only to offenders, who do
not know how much they owe, how much their monthly payments
56. More detailed information about the statistical analyses can be obtained from the
first author.
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should be, and where the money they pay goes,57 but also to judg-
es, prosecutors, and probation officers. Conversations with court
employees suggest that no one in the court system understands all
of the economic sanctions or the order in which they are supposed
to be paid," despite regulations established by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania and promulgated by the Court Administrator of
Pennsylvania entitled "The Allocation of Monies in the Uniform
Disbursement Schedule." 9 If clarity is one goal of the legal sys-
tem, then economic sanctions in Pennsylvania do not meet this
standard.
Moreover, this variety of sanction is unfair to individuals in
counties that have a larger number of economic sanctions, most of
which are county costs/fees. Unfairness occurs because individu-
als in these counties have a greater chance of having these addi-
tional sanctions imposed, because judges must be responsive to
the public and these county costs/fees are one way that the eco-
nomic burden on citizens is shifted.
One possible solution to the problem of so many different types
of economic sanctions is simply to reduce the number of county
costs/fees.6 ° The large number of possible county-level economic
sanctions explains most of the variation between counties, and
essentially the system as it presently stands awards counties that
are more creative in creating new costs/fees. The argument
against such costs/fees would be that criminal justice is an obliga-
tion of government that should be paid for by the government, not
by criminal offenders. But as long as the imposed costs/fees are
consistent across counties, one could claim that they are uniform
and therefore fair.
57. R. Barry Ruback, Stacy N. Hoskins, Alison C. Cares, & Ben Feldmeyer, Perception
and Payment of Economic sanctions: A Survey of Offenders, FED. PROBATION 26, 27 (2006).
58. R. Barry Ruback, Alison C. Cares, & Stacy N. Hoskins, Evaluation of Best Practices
in Restitution and Victim Compensation Orders and Payments, REPORT TO THE
PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION ON SENTENCING (2006).
59. Title 42. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, Part IV. Financial Matters, Chapter 35.
Budget and Finance, Subchapter A. General Principles.
60. Recently, there have been calls for the abolition of these fees for three reasons: (1)
they lack a clear penological rationale, (2) they raise questions of fairness because they
make sentences too severe, they reflect class bias, they reflect disparity, and they have a
large impact on families, and (3) they are not cost effective. Harris et al., On Cash and
Conviction: Money Sanctions as Misguided Policy, CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y (2011).
Based on their analysis of fees in the fifteen states with the largest prison populations,
Bannon, Nagrecha, and Diller, supra note 14, at 13, have called for lawmakers to consider
the total debt burden on offenders before adding new fees or increasing fee amounts. They
also have suggested that indigent offenders should not have to pay these fees.
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However, costs/fees that are unique to a county raise a different
question. How fair is it to an offender if the burden of paying for
the costs of criminal justice is shifted to offenders only if the coun-
ty is poor and therefore cannot afford to pay? Or, is it fair if the
county has a large population of citizens who generally oppose
government and is therefore more likely than citizens in other
counties to favor user fees? Although one could argue that coun-
ties should be able to impose whatever fees they wish, it would be
difficult to defend these sanctions in terms of fairness to offenders.
That is, it would be difficult to argue that offenders who live in
certain counties should have to pay higher costs/fees merely be-
cause of where they live, not because of their actual offense.
V. CONCLUSION
Part of what makes a system fair is attainment of a common
understanding, both by those who administer it and those against
whom it is imposed. The sheer number of different types of eco-
nomic sanctions available across Pennsylvania, and even in any
one county, makes it unlikely that defendants would understand
what these sanctions are for, how much money they owe for each
sanction, and how their payments are directed toward each of the-
se different sanctions. Our findings that there are county-specific
differences in the number of available economic sanctions and in
the economic sanctions that are actually used, suggest there is
inconsistency and unfairness. Moreover, our findings regarding
the effects of the offender's prior record and age on the imposition
of total economic sanctions suggests that changes, perhaps more
structure through guidelines, would be helpful.
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